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In general terms, both from an international human rights law and a transitional justice 
perspective, it is crucial that the report to the UN does not solely approach the issues from a 
business and human rights logic, informed by and applying the language of the UNGPs. This 
would be problematic because the consultation was necessary precisely because the UNGPs 
need input from other perspectives in order to consider the particular problems that arise in 
conflict, post-conflict and transitional justice settings. More importantly, given the non-binding 
nature of the UNGPs, as far as the business sector is concerned, this would invite a focus on 
responsibilities where in fact legal violations often will have taken place that create legal 
obligations towards victims. 
Our work in Colombia3 has shown several issues that could be important for recommendations 
in this area. The involvement of business in complicated conflict scenarios is complex and can 
range from business and individual economic actors being willing perpetrators of conflict 
related crimes and human rights violations; acting under coercion; benefiting from the conflict 
without incurring legal responsibility; being victims of conflict related crimes or a mix of these 
different forms of involvement. Recommendations on business in conflict, post-conflict and 
transitional justice situations therefore need to distinguish clearly these different types of 
involvement.  
This is important because where, as will often be the case, the involvement of businesses in 
conflict amounts to criminal behaviour, the state has an obligation to investigate, prosecute and 
punish the most egregious forms of these violations and even where the violations do not reach 
that level, the criminal nature of the wrongs to the victims mean that reparation is not a 
voluntary act but rather a legal obligation. This needs to find its way into how to think about 
the state obligation to protect and the remedy pillar of the GPs.  
On the respect side, this could be captured by the responsibility to avoid complicity in human 
rights violations, but the content of this responsibility would need to be spelled out in detail. It 
is obvious that businesses violate the responsibility to respect if they actively and willingly 
participate in human rights violations that amount to international crimes through co-designing 
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the criminal policies and activities, voluntarily financing armed groups that carry them out or 
instigating certain crimes, such as extrajudicial killings of trade unionists or other social 
leaders. However, complicity can take many forms which could be elaborated further to make 
clear the boundaries between lawful and unlawful business practices during armed conflict.  
This is particularly complex in the context of financing. In the Colombian example, unlike in 
countries such as Argentina, financing relates less to banks and more to businesses or individual 
economic actors financing the armed groups and/or the crimes they commit. It needs to be 
made clear that short of coercion, in many cases this amounts to criminal complicity and 
therefore entails legal obligations that go beyond the merely voluntary. Also, it needs to be 
made clear that duress or coercion is a rather limited legal defence or excuse, in that it entails 
a notion of lack of alternatives and also proportionality. As the industrialist cases in Nuremberg 
already highlighted, a threat to economic interests does not justify complicity in international 
crimes.  
With regard to businesses that move into conflict ridden areas, it will be particularly difficult 
to justify any complicity with the parties of the conflict and due diligence responsibilities need 
to include an assessment of whether in that particular zone and at that particular time, business 
operations can be carried out without a high risk of becoming complicit in conflict related 
human rights violations.  
What all of this shows that in many contexts, parts of the business sector do not stand outside 
of conflicts, but are rather an integral part of it.  
Moving to the topic of transitional justice, the question linked to TJ assumes that business can 
play a role in transitional justice and that the GPs can have implications in TJ settings. From a 
TJ perspective, additional questions arise. For example,  
o What are state obligations in TJ settings and how do they apply to businesses? 
o How can TJ mechanisms such as truth commissions, criminal trials, reparations 
and guarantees of non-recurrence address the role of business actors? 
o How to address the tensions between achieving business accountability for their 
role in a conflict and their role as investors and promoters of post-conflict 
reconstruction? 
o How can TJ inform the GPs? 
For the reasons highlighted on the previous page, with regard to the role businesses can play in 
TJ, a clear distinction needs to be made between different economic actors based on the type 
of their involvement. Where they were part of the conflict and committed conflict related 
human rights violations, the state has an obligation to investigate their role and to hold them to 
account. From a TJ perspective, this can be done through a combination of various mechanisms 
based on the four pillars of transitional justice, truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-
recurrence. One way of achieving this is shown by the Colombian experience. Accepting that 
some economic actors committed conflict related crimes, they were initially included in the 
mandatory jurisdiction of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace. Those with the highest 
responsibility were given access to lenient sanctions, those with lower levels of responsibility 
could apply for a waiver of prosecution. In all cases, the benefits of the SJP depended on 
contributions to truth, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence.  
Including economic actors into the TJ process alongside the other actors of the conflict, in the 
Colombian context the state military and the FARC, might be a good way to reflect that 
economic actors who committed conflict related crimes were also actors of the conflict and 
should be treated similarly to the combatants. However, the Colombian example also highlights 
some problems that can arise when including such a powerful actor in a process focused on 
criminal responsibility. The SJP’s mandatory jurisdiction over these actors was declared to be 
unconstitutional by the Colombian Constitutional Court (Decision C-674 of 2017). This was 
based on the idea that the SJP was a jurisdiction agreed to and designed for the combatants, but 
that other actors, including economic actors, need to adhere to its jurisdiction voluntarily and 
otherwise stay under the jurisdiction of the ordinary criminal courts. This shows a mistaken 
view that economic actors were not really part of the conflict and has created enormous 
problems, as there are very few incentives for these actors to engage with SJP out of their own 
volition. To avoid this problem and the fragmentation of achieving legal accountability for 
conflict related crimes, an important recommendation to states could be that where specific 
transitional justice tribunals are being created, they should be given jurisdiction over all actors 
of the conflict. 
Moving to the remedy pillar, another recommendation would be that it is the responsibility of 
businesses to remedy their past behaviour by engaging with a TJ process and assuming their 
criminal responsibility as well as contributing to truth, reparation and guarantees of non-
recurrence would be important. This could be a way to conceptualise synergies between the 
business and human rights and the TJ frameworks, ie that the 4 pillars of TJ are integrated in 
the remedies pillar of the GPs. 
Staying with the remedy side, where businesses incurred criminal liability, the obligation to 
provide remedies goes well beyond symbolic reparations, and rather includes all forms of 
reparation, in particular restitution (eg in the context of land displacement) and compensation. 
To the extent that symbolic reparations are provided, it needs to be clear that they do not replace 
other forms of reparation and that they need to be constructed from the perspective of the 
victims, not determined by the businesses. 
With regard to what role businesses can play in TJ contexts, even those that did not incur legal 
responsibility but, for example, benefited from the conflict, should be very strongly encouraged 
to engage with the truth component of the TJ process and provide full truth and assume their 
role in the conflict, even if they acted within the realm of the lawful. This is also important for 
corporations that might have actively and willingly contributed to serious human rights 
violations, but are not criminally liable simply because criminal corporate responsibility does 
not exist in many countries. In such cases, they should also be encouraged to contribute 
reparation, for example where their acts harmed particular communities. Engaging with a truth 
commission can also contribute to guarantees of non-recurrence, as recognition of past 
wrongdoing is necessary to avoid it in the future, and to construct this narrative is one of the 
tasks of truth commissions. One form of guarantees of non-recurrence would be to recommend 
to states to introduce corporate criminal responsibility, given that often the interests behind the 
human rights violations are those of the corporate entity, not of individuals who are the only 
ones who can currently be held to account in most cases. 
Where remedies, but also simply business involvement in post-conflict reconstruction, takes 
the form of development measures, it is crucial that there be consultation with the relevant 
communities where these measures are taking place, to provide development based on their 
needs and avoid revictimization. 
Lastly, it is crucial to be aware that TJ processes are highly contextual and the 
recommendations therefore should include that there cannot be one single set of ‘best practices’ 
for business in all conflict/post-conflict and TJ settings and that the business and human rights 
responses to these scenarios need to be flexible enough to be context sensitive. Moreover, some 
contexts, as it is the case in Colombia, might experience political violence after peace 
agreements have been reached and TJ mechanisms started to operate. Transitions are difficult 
processes in which peaceful regions/areas can coexists with places where the conflict reignites. 
In these contexts, businesses should support TJ mechanisms as well as be extremely careful 
not to get involved in persistent forms of violence.   
 
